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INSURANCE; PAYMENT OF PREMIUM-Light vs. Equitable Life Insur-
ance Company-No. 14027-District Court of El Paso County.
Hon. John M. Meikle, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Company issued policy for $3,000.00 on life of plain-
tiff's husband, on quarterly premium paying basis. The first install-
ment was paid in advance of the execution of the policy which provided
for the payment of a like sum "on or before the 27th day of June,
September, December and March of each year until the death of the
insured." Another provision set out that "a failure to pay any
premium note or premium extension agreement when due and payable
shall cause the policy to cease and determine," with certain exceptions.
It also provided that payment of any premium should not maintain
the policy in force beyond the date when the next payment was due
and that any indebtedness to the company on account of the policy
and any unpaid portion of the premium for the current insurance year
in which the death of the insured occurred would be deducted in any
settlement under'the policy. After delivery of the policy and payment
of first quarterly premium, the insured and plaintiff, as beneficiary
delivered the policy to defendant with application for a change of
premium paying provisions from quarterly to annual basis, and insured
submitted therewith three promissory notes each bearing date of issu-
ance of policy drawing interest and each being for part of the premium
maturing three, six and nine months after the date of the policy. Each
note pledged that if it were not paid at maturity it was not to be con-
sidered as payment of the premium and that the policy would, there-
upon, without notice, cease to be in force and would have no value.
This change was duly accepted. The first note matured June 27, 1933,
prior to which date the defendant notified insured of its maturity. No
payment was made and on November 30, 1933, insured died and
beneficiary sued when defendant refused to pay under policy on ground
that policy was not in force.
HELD: 1. The giving of the notes by the insured and accept-
ance thereof by defendant did not constitute a payment of a year's
premium extending the life of the insurance contract for one year from
its date and beyond the date of the death of the insured.
2. The insurance under the terms of the policy and the agree-
ment of the parties did not extend beyond the 27th day of June, the
first quarter period.
3. The Court could not more definitely fix the rights of the in-
sured than he did himself, and the beneficiary, of course, is bound by
what he signed.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.




vs. Bates-District Court of Ouray County-No. 14219-Hon.
George W. Bruce, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff was an undertaker at Montrose and defendant
was a registrar of vital statistics for Ouray County. C. died in Mont-
rose County and plaintiff was employed to inter her body. The
registrar of vital statistics for Montrose County issued to plaintiff a
permit to remove the body to Ouray, where, without a bur'l permit
from any registrar of vital statistics, plaintiff caused body of C. to be
interred. Later, the defendant, by sworn complaint before a justice
of the peace of Ouray County charged plaintiff with a misdemeanor.
On trial before the justice, plaintiff was adjudged to be guilty. On
appeal to the County Court, he was acquitted. Predicated on such
facts, the plaintiff sued defendant for malicious prosecution and al-
leged that the defendant acted "maliciously and without probable
cause." The trial Court granted a non-suit.
HELD: 1. Defendant was officially concerned with activities
pertaining to burial of deceased persons in his district, and moreover,
in the discharge of his duties he was "subject to the rules and regula-
tions of the state registrar" and to the law. Defendant believed that
a condition precedent to the interment of the body in his district was
the procurement of a burial permit from the registrar of that district
and so informed plaintiff. Plaintiff believed otherwise and "forced"
the issue. There is nothing from which malice on the part of the de-
fendant could be inferred, and "malice is an essential element" in this
type of case.
2. Probable cause also appeared from plaintiff's showing. Where
a justice of the peace before whom the plaintiff was originally tried had
jurisdiction, and adjudged his guilt, and no showing that the con-
viction before the justice was procured by fraud or other improper
means, the element of probable cause, established by the first conviction,
is not eradicated by reversal on appeal.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Knous, concur.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS-REDEMPTION-TAX SALE-PLEADING
-CORPORATIONS--CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES-PRESUMP-
TION OF TITLE-PLEADING-Bean vs. Westwood-District
Court of Clear Creek County-No. 14172-Hon. Samuel W.
Johnson, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. One having an equitable title may redeem from a
tax sale.
2. One who has a deed from record owner valid on its fact, but
which may be defective because not issued by the proper group of
officers of a defunct foreign corporation, has such an equitable interest
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that he may redeem from a tax sale and compel bolder of certificate to
surrender it and receive redemption money.
3. Statutes providing for the redemption of property sold for
taxes are to be liberally construed in favor of the redemption.
4. There is a presumption of title arising in favor of equitable
owner of property, and the treasurer, acting in a quasi judicial capacity
found that such owner, upon exhibition of his deed, was entitled to
redeem.
5. Where one seeks to show that under the laws of a foreign
state, a corporation was defunct, reliance upon the statutes of such state
could follow if the statutes had been pleaded. The nonexistence of
the foreign corporation, brought about by state officials acting under
laws of a foreign state, is a question of fact, and it must be pleaded.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bakke, concur.
WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-MUTUAL WILLS-WIDOW'S ALLOWANCE
-EQUITY-Re: Estate of John H. Williams, deceased-Williams
et al., vs. Polland-District Court of Denver-No. 14177-Hon.
Robert W. Steele, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Proceeding under a petition labeled as being for the con-
struction of the will of John H. Williams. John H. Williams and
Mary E. Williams married late in life and after Mary E. Williams had
had two children with a former husband. No other children were born.
They contemporaneously executed separate wills, each giving to the
other a life estate in all of their property, with remainders in the case
of Mary E. Williams to her children and in the case of John H. Wil-
liams to his brother and four nieces. Mr. John H. Williams died and
his will was filed for probate. Mrs. Mary E. Williams, the widow,
filed her written renunciation of any benefits under the will and elected
to take her share of the property under the statute. Thereafter, she
filed her claim for widow's allowance, and upon her petition, she was
awarded certain real estate previously owned by the husband, in lieu
of cash. The widow died later and the administration of her estate
as on an intestate was commenced. Her will apparently was not found.
The petitioners, being the heirs of Mr. John H. Williams, allege that
the wills were contractual, mutual and reciprocal and ask that they be
decreed to be the owners in fee simple of the real estate in accordance
with the residuary clause of the husband's will and ask that the widow's
election to take under the statute be set aside and that the order for
widow's allowance and the award of the real property in lieu of cash
be vacated and that the administration of her estate, as an intestate, be
enjoined. The County and District Courts upheld the validity of the
widow's allowance and award. In neither case were any findings made
with reference to the alleged mutuality of the wills.
HELD: 1. It has been uniformly held that a claim for widow's
allowance is a claim against the estate of her deceased husband and that
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she is entitled to the allowance independent of her distributive share in
her husband's estate.
2. Where the husband leaves a will, the widow is entitled to the
allowance regardless of any election to take or not to take under the will.
3. This rule is not changed by the fact that the husband and
wife may have executed mutual wills, in itself, and in the absence of
any effective waiver of the widow's allowance by the wife.
4. A widow may waive her allowance by contract with her
husband; but the waiver cannot arise by presumption, assumption, or
construction.
5. Where there has been a violation of the agreement upon which
the mutual or reciprocal wills are based, a Court of Equity, by reason
of its extraordinary power to enforce specific performance of contracts
and to prevent frauds, in an appropriate suit and proper case, enforces
such agreement in an equitable manner by decreeing specific performance
of the agreement or by impressing a trust upon the property in favor
of the parties aggrieved by the violation of the agreement.
6. No opinion is expressed upon the issue of the alleged mutual-
ity of the wills and the authority of Mrs. Williams to revoke her will,
if she did, nor her right to elect to take under the statute if the wills
were mutual, leaving such matters to be determined, if and when they
are raised, in an appropriate proceeding.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Young and Mr. Justice Holland, concur.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - PLEADING - STATUTES - CHARTER
PROVISIONS-NOTICE OF INJURY IN PRIVATE PLACE-Emily
Horst vs. City and County of Denver-District Court of Denver
-No. 14130-Hon. Charles C. Sackmann, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: City maintained a baseball park within its corporate
limits across the street from which plaintiff resided. One afternoon
while a game was in progress, plaintiff, in the act of opening the front
door of her residence, was struck by a ball and sustained the injuries
for which she claims damages.
The Statute requires notice to the City in all cases of claim for
damages for personal injury, whereas the charter requires such notice
only where the injury occurs in a public place. This injury occurred
in a private place. Plaintiff's position is that the charter provision
superseded the statute in toto, hence in case of injury in a private place
no notice is required. The city's position is that the charter superseded
the statute only in so far as the two were in conflict; or covered the
identical subject; that since the statute relates to injuries in both public
and private places and the charter relates to injuries in public places
only, the statute is still in force in Denver so far as it covers injuries in
private places, hence notice to the City must be given and pleaded.
The trial Court sustained defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's com-
plaint.
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HELD: 1. A statute relative to notice of personal injury sus-
tained in a private place is not superseded by a charter provision relative
to notice of personal injury sustained in a public place.
2. Where a charter provision and a statute do not cover the
same subject matter and are not in conflict with each other, they both
apply, and the statute governs such situation not referred to or covered
by the charter.
3. There is no prejudicial error where trial Court strikes from
a complaint a conclusion of law.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Justice Bakke and Mr.
Justice Knous, concur.
QUIET TITLE - MINING LEASES - ASSIGNMENTS - LEVY - REAL
ESTATE-Routt County Mining Company vs. Stutheit, et al.-
District Court of Routt County-No. 14070-Hon. Charles E.
Herrick, Judge-Reversed and Remanded with Instructions.
FACTS: Action to quiet title under a mining lease from the
United States. Plaintiff in error claims under an assignment from
lessee, Gwynn, while defendants in error claim under sheriff's deed
based upon a certificate of levy under judgment and execution against
Gwynn's interest in the lease. Plaintiffs obtained judgment against
Gwynn, and on September 15, 1933, an execution was issued and the
sheriff levied upon the coal lease in question as the property of Gwynn.
The certificate of levy was recorded the same day sheriff's sale was had
on October 21, 1933, and deed issued and recorded November, 1934.
On August 17, 1933, Gwynn assigned his lease to H. who in
turn transferred his rights to defendant mining company which went
into possession under the assignment about the middle of August, 1933,
and is still in possession.
HELD: 1. Where no transcript'of judgment has been filed, and
where a certificate of levy under such judgment was not recorded until
a month after the assignment of judgment debtor's interest in the lease,
the judgment creditor has no claim against the leasehold interest.
2. The fact that the assignee had knowledge of the judgment is
immaterial for the judgment creditors had no lien until they filed their
transcript or made a levy.
3. A lease of land for a term of years is real estate.
4. Although the lease states that an assignment thereof may not
be concluded without the consent of the lessor, such a provision is for
the benefit of the lessor, and if he makes no protest, others may not
do so.
5. The judgment of trial Court must be reversed and the cause
remanded, with instructions to quiet the title in the defendant mining
company.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. En Banc. Mr. Justice Bouck
concurs in the conclusion.
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NEGLIGENCE-HUSBAND AND WIFE-THIRD PARTIES-RIGHT OF
CONSORTIuM-Giggey us. Gallagher Transportation Co., et at.-
District Court of Boulder County-No. 14157-Hon. Frederic
W. Clark, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action to recover damages for alleged loss of "society
and consortium" of husband caused by injuries received by him and
allegedly occasioned by the negligence, etc., of the defendants. The hus-
band sued and recovered judgment against the present defendants for
the same alleged injuries, which judgment was recently affirmed in the
Supreme Court. Defendants demurred to complaint. It was sustained
and plaintiff elected to stand on demurrer.
HELD: 1. The right of the wife to consortium of the husband
has not been directly invaded, and her loss has only resulted indirectly
from the negligent act of another. Her recovery for this indirect loss,
in the contemplation of the law, already has been realized indirectly
through the action by her husband in which he recovered damages for
the injury to which her indirect loss is attributable.
2. The wrongful acts complained of were committed against
the husband and not directly against the wife.
3. There is no authority supporting plaintiff's right to recover
for the loss of consortium above occasioned by the negligent acts of
third persons, and "there is legion of text and decided cases squarely
holding that she has no such right."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Knous, concur.
REAL ESTATE- DEEDS OF TRUST-FORECLOSURE-GIFTS-PRE-
SUMPTIONS-Howard vs. Barrett, et at.-District Court of Jef-
ferson County-No. 14147-Hon. Samuel W. Johnson, Judge-
Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Where a mother advances money as a gift to her
daughter and son-in-law, part of which is used to purchase real estate
and part of which is used for the living expenses of the children, and
later purchases first deeds of trust on said property, and forecloses same,
a holder of a second deed of trust may not maintain a suit in equity to
establish a resulting trust subjecting the title of the mother, on fore-
closure, to the second deed of trust, without showing that she assumed
or agreed to pay the obligation, or that the property was originally pur-
chased for the mother.
2. "The law presumes that such gifts arise between parents and
children and this legal presumption prevails until the contrary is clearly
and unequivocally established."
3. Where there is sufficient competent evidence upon which the
trial Court could find that the mother dlid not participate in the trans-
action, did not sign the mortgage or in any way assume it, the decision
will not be disturbed.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Knous, concur.
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PRACTICE OF LAW-ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-ADVERTISING--CON-
TEMPT - NOTARY PUBLIC - People vs. Kinsey-No. 14065-
Original Proceedings-Rule Discharged.
FACTS: Information filed by Attorney General charging Kinsey
with advertising and representing to the public that he had authority
to perform the functions of an attorney at law and act in a legal capacity.
It was also charged that Kinsey caused to be inserted in a weekly news-
paper, under the caption, "Business and Professional Directory," an
advertisement as follows: "G. W. Kinsey, 1889 South Pearl. Legal
Documents." It appeared that the advertisement appeared under the
subcaption, "Notary." It was further alleged that he caused to be
filed with the Inheritance Tax Department, a Petition for the appraisal
and waiver of taxes in a particular estate, and that he was not licensed
to practice as an attorney. The Respondent admitted the advertise-
ment, but contended that it was not his intention to practice law.
HELD: 1. "The advertisement is as consistent and reasonable
if interpreted to mean that respondent will take acknowledgments or
certify legal documents, as it is if construed to mean that he will write
legal documents contrary to law," and the penalty of being held in
contempt of Court, ane punishment therefor, will not be imposed on
the basis of facts resting on mere speculation.
2. A respondent will not be adjudged in contempt of Court
"on a record which discloses nothing more than that in a business
directory published in a weekly paper, his name, under the classification
of 'Notary,' appears in juxtaposition to the words 'legal documents'."
3. It is permissible for one in attending to his own personal
business of making a loan to be secured by a Trust Deed on real prop-
erty which was, or at least which he feared was, subject to a tax, which
tax is a lien on the property until paid, when the encumbrancer has
notice, to file a petition to have an appraisement made and a waiver
issued by the Inhe.itance Tax Department on the property on which
he was making the loan.
4. If there was no administration of the estate in which the
real estate was involved, the signing of Respondent's name as attorney
for an estate to an application for such appraisal and waiver, was not
practicing law, nor a representation that he was authorized to prac-
tice law.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr.
Justice Bakke not participating.
PRACTICE OF LAW-CONTEMPT OF COURT-People vs. Bennett-No.
14071-Original Proceeding-Rule Discharged.
FACTS: Attorney General files petition to require B to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt of Court for engag-
ing in the practice of law, "and for advertising and holding himself out
as having authority to perform the functions and duties of an attorney
at law and act in legal capacity." He is alleged to have caused a large
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wooden sign to be painted and erected on a street intersection, and upon
which sign appears the following words: "Walter B. Bennett, Lots on
easy terms, Free Notary Legal Papers, 2167 South Corona, Sp. 2872."
Respondent admits sign but denies ever holding himself out to the public
as having authority to practice law. He admitted having in his posses-
sion legal forms for deeds, bills of sale, chattel mortgages, etc.
HELD: 1. Where there is no proof that a respondent ever per-
formed or held himself out as offering to perform legal functions, the
Court will not assume that he intended the public to understand that
he was willing to violate the law.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr.
Justice Bakke, not participating.
PRACTICE OF LAW-CONTEMPT-People vs. Jersin-No. 14072-
Original Proceedings-Rule Discharged.
HELD: 1. The drawing of wills, as a practice, is the practice
of law.
2. Drawing three deeds and a will at one time for a friend and
fellow countryman, and accepting $13.00 as a gift, thereafter, from
such friend, is not sufficient upon which to base the conclusion that
the drawer is practicing law. It must be shown that he drew other
such instruments or that he holds himself out as willing or as com-
petent to do so.
3. It is not true that all acts done by a lawyer and constituting
a practice of his profession, if performed by a layman, constitute a
practice of law by the latter. There is a twilight zone where the acts
done are to be judged by the surrounding circumstances.
4. Business is not the outgrowth of law; the practice of law is
the outgrowth of business. In the absence of explicit statute, Courts
should not be too ready to punish for contempt those who take care
of the exigencies of business so it may move forward to its designed
objectives.
5. Express intention to bring the Court into contempt is not
always necessary to constitute a contempt, but its absence is properly
to be considered as one of the circumstances of the case.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr.
Justice Bakke not participating.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-WRiT OF HABEAS
CORPUS--Opal Hill us. Roy Best-Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus-No. 1413 7--Original Proceeding-Petition Denied.
FACTS: Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Hill was con-
victed of burglary and larceny and was sentenced on both crimes,
sentences to run consecutively. He has now served the minimum
sentence first imposed for the burglary count. His contention is that
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judgment imposes a second sentence for one continuous criminal act
and thereby he has been placed in double jeopardy.
HELD: 1. Burglary and larceny are separate offenses and con-
tain separate elements. A conviction for two distinct offenses is not
double jeopardy. This follows the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court.
En Banc. Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous.
CONTEMPT-PRACTICING LAW - ATTORNEYS AT LAW - People Vs.
P. G. Wicks - No. 14066 - Original Proceedings - Rule Dis-
charged.
FACTS: Defendant, a Notary Public, advertised "Legal Papers
made; deeds, trust deeds, mortgages, chattel mortgages, releases, exten-
sions, affidavits, contracts, and wills." The Attorney General filed a
petition against him asking that he be required to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt of Court for engaging in the
practice of law and for advertising and holding himself out as having
authority to practice law.
HELD: As a Notary Public the defendant could do the various
things which the statute gives him power to do. "The record does not
justify even an inference that respondent sought to create in the mind
of anyone that he was a licensed attorney. It does not contain a sug-
gestion that he ever drew a single legal paper where his acts were not
within the limits of the power conferred upon him by virtue of his
notarial office. He is not amenable to discipline under C. L. 1921,
Sec. 6017, for his belief or his intent alone, and even if so for an overt
act, that is neither charged nor admitted."
En Banc. Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - FINDINGS OF FACT - POWERS OF
DISTRICT COURT-The American Mining Company, et al., vs.
Martin Zupet-District Court of Denver-No. 14207-Hon.
George F. Dunklee, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: This is a workmen's compensation case in which claim-
ant sought compensation for total loss of right eye, partial disability
of left eye and left ear. The commission awarded claimant disability
for total loss of right eye, but denied his other claims. The trial Court
disagreed with the commission's findings, and reversed it.
HELD: 1. There was sufficient competent evidence upon which
the commission properly could make the award which was set aside by
the District Court.
2. The trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction and overreached the
limitations of its powers in changing the findings of the commission.
3. The matter of determining the probative effect of evidence in
such cases, where there is a conflict, still remains exclusively with the
commission. In Dept.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bakke.
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LOST WILLS-HEARINGS-SETTING OF CASE FOR TRIAL, NOTICE OF
-DISCRETION OF COURT-DISMISSAL-RECORD ON APPEAL-
-ORAL STIPULATIONS OF THE PARTIES-In re: Estate of Martin
Eder et al. vs. The Methodist Episcopal Church Association of
Fowler, Colo. et al.-No. 13967-Decided April 19, 1937-Dis-
trict Court of Otero County-Hon. John H. Voorhees, Judge-
Reversed.
FACTS: The sole question involved in this case is whether the
District Court of Otero County properly exercised its discretion in dis-
missing an appeal by caveators from a judgment of the County Court
admitting to probate an alleged lost will of Martin Eder, deceased,
against which a caveat had been filed by certain alleged heirs of said
deceased. It appears that counsel for caveators were served with notice
that counsel for proponents would apply to the court on May 7th for
setting of the cause; that on May 6th, one day before the notice required
counsel for caveators to appear, the court set the cause for May 16th, and
the clerk notified counsel for caveators by letter dated May 6, 1935, that
the case had been set for May 16th; that when counsel for caveators
appeared on May 15th and consented that the order be vacated and the
matter re-set for that day, he came in response to the notice of application
to set, and was not prepared for trial.
HELD: 1. It was an abuse of the court's discretion summarily
to dismiss the appeal without notice of the motion to dismiss being
served on counsel for cavators.
2. Both sides are in pari delicto regarding the condition of the
record on appeal.
3. Ordinarily, courts take no notice of stipulations of the parties
not in writing or not made in open court, but they will be considered
where the record is peculiar and incomplete.
4. When the setting of the case for trial is not on the first day of
the term, a notice of application in writing must be served on opposing
counsel "not less than forty-eight hours before the time fixed in said
notice, and shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court not less than twen-
ty-four hours before the time noticed for setting said cause."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-PURCHASE AFTER MATURITY-TRUST
DEEDS-NONSUIT-MATURE NOTES-McDermott vs. Perkins-
No. 14032-Decided April 19, 1937-District Court of Denver
-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Dearmin, on October 9, 1931, purchased real estate, giv-
ing a second deed of trust for $1,000 to Blue and Horton to secure bal-
ance of purchase price. In July, 1932, Dearmin sold the property to
Perkins, defendant in error. Dearmin was to pay off his indebtedness to
Blue and Horton, evidenced by the second deed of trust, and convey to
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Perkins, subject to a first trust deed, and a second for $542.35, payable
$15.00 monthly. Blue and Horton accepted the balance due them on
the $1,000 note, and endorsed on the back thereof the amount Perkins
was to pay, and had Perkins sign the note as maker. The amount so
endorsed was $542.35, representing the balance of the purchase price to
be paid by Perkins to Dearmin. This arrangement was to avoid draw-
ing a new second deed of trust in that amount. Dearmin then made
and delivered a deed to Perkins for the property. The note on December
16, 1932, was sold to McDermott, who, upon prior and subsequent
defaults in the payments, brought suit on the note. Perkins contends
that the proper course to have been pursued was a foreclosure of the deed
of trust, and not suit on the note. The court granted Perkins' motion
for a nonsuit, and McDermott assigns error.
HELD: 1. When Perkins assumed the mortgage as part of the
purchase price, his obligation to pay became absolute, and when he
signed the note, as part of the purchase price, he breathed life into it,
regardless of its condition prior to that moment, and he cannot possess
the property-which the evidence shows he does-and question the
validity of his debt for the balance of its purchase price, by reason of the
form of the evidence of the indebtedness.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-EVIDENCE-Ludlow et a[. vs. Ludlow
-No. 13915-Decided April 19, 193 7-District Court of Lati-
mer County-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Plaintiffs in error are hereinafter referred to as Mr. and
Mrs. Ludlow, respectively, and their deceased son as Myron. Defendant
in error, Ruth Ludlow, is referred to as Ruth. At the time of the death
of Myron, he and Ruth were husband and wife, but separated. She
had sued for separate maintenance and he had counterclaimed for di-
vorce. Ruth brought this suit against the Ludlows for damages for the
alienation of the affections of Myron. At the trial much hearsay evi-
dence was admitted concerning declarations of Myron, and there was
much evidence, all more or less prejudicial, and all immaterial, which
was allowed in evidence.
HELD: 1. To sustain this judgment requires that the court warn
parents to oppose in good faith the marriage of their children, to advise
with them in good faith about their marital difficulties after the relation-
ship has been established, to offer them refuge when the home has been
broken up, and to support them in the maintenance of their legal rights
under such fortunate circumstances, only at the peril of being mulcted in
heavy damages for their loyalty to their offspring. Any such conclusion
is contrary to the well established law of all jurisdictions.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Young dissent.
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EQUITABLE CONVERSION-LEASE AND OPTION-JUDGMENT CRED-
ITORS-Chain O'Mines, Inc., et al., vs. Harry M. Williamson,
et al. - District Court of Gilpin County - No. 14010 - Hon.
Samuel W. Johnson, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Chain O'Mines entered into a lease of its mine claims
and gave the lessee an option to purchase. Before lessee exercised its
option, a number of judgment liens were recorded against the property
and property sold. Upon the exercise of the option the Chain O'Mines
contended that the purchase price, which was paid into Court should
go to it and not to the judgment creditors in that the property was
converted into personalty as of the date of the lease and option, and
that levies of execution on the real property and its subsequent sale
were subject to the lease and option and were defeated upon its exer-
cise and therefore, the purchase price remains the property of Chain
O'Mines.
HELD: While doctrine of equitable conversion applies as of the
date of contract in unconditional sales contracts, yet as to an option
contract the conversion does not take place until its exercise if at all.
Therefore, Chain O'Mines' title was effectively divested by the Sher-
iff's sale and it had no right to the purchase price money. In Dept.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Young, concur.
CRIMINAL LAW-PREJUDCIAL ERROR-ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE-
INSURANCE-ARSON-Peter Hanson Smith vs. State of Colorado
-No. 13996-Decided April 19, 1937-District Court of El
Paso County-Hon. Arthur Cornforth, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: To a judgment of conviction of "Arson-Fourth De-
gree," error is assigned. The information charged Hanner, Peter Hanson
Smith (plaintiff in error) and Wilson Smith with the alleged crime.
Severance of trial was had; Wilson Smith pleaded guilty, and Hanner-
not yet tried-testified as a witness for the people. The court considers
only one assignment of error, to the effect that in permitting a witness on
rebuttal to testify that one Thompson was a "notorious fire bug," and in
substantiation thereof to allow the introduction of an exhibit showing
what was said to be a picture of Thompson, adorned with a number,
and bearing legend of Thompson's conviction of arson, the court mate-
,rially prejudiced plaintiff in error. It appears that on March 28, 1935,
plaintiff in error purchased a hotel; that sometime the following month,
Thompson bargained to buy one-half interest in the property; that when
contracting to buy an interest in the property, Thompson insisted that
the insurance thereon should then, and before he purchased it, be raised
from $3,500 to $25,000; that on Thompson's demand, plaintiff in
error did take out $15,000 insurance on the building and $5,000 on the
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furnishings. Later Thompson could not raise the necessary money and
the sale was rescinded. On October 5, 1935, plaintiff in error sold and
conveyed the property to Hanner, and at the same time assigned the
insurance policies to Hanner. There was an attempt to burn the hotel
on February 28, 1936, but only Wilson Smith had to do with the ac-
tualities at the time of the event.
HELD: 1. It is vitally important that nothing be introduced in
evidence, not relevant to the crime charged, which would naturally preju-
dice the jury.
2. Hanner, not plaintiff in error, owned the property involved,
held the policies of insurance, and, legally, was the one in a position to
gain from destruction of the property. Considering the showing as of
the time the testimony in chief was closed, the jury may well have been
in doubt as to where the truth lay, and the casting into the scales of
justice at the last moment the story about Thompson, who did not
testify and was neither on trial nor accused in the information, was prob-
ably calculated to influence the balance adversely to plaintiff in error.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
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